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All the world’s a stage, 
And the men and women merely players: 
They have their exits and their entrances; 
And one [wo]man in [her] time plays many parts.1 
 
Jacques’ observation in Shakespeare’s As You Like It describes the 
typical rape and sexual assault trial in the United States. The complainant2 
plays many different characters throughout the course of the trial. Pre-
written cultural scripts dictate her3 lines. The setting is both the courtroom 
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1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7.  
2 This Article uses the terms “accuser” and “complainant” to signify the person 
who has allegedly been raped, and “accused” and “defendant” to signify the alleged rapist. 
At a rape trial, the person who was raped is not so much a “victim” as she is an “accuser.” 
Her role, as will be demonstrated in this Article, is not perceived as a passive one. Instead, 
the fact that she is the primary actor, from the jury’s perspective, is very important for 
understanding the linguistic power plays that occur during the rape trial. Likewise, the 
alleged rapist is constructed as a passive agent who must be on the defensive because of the 
charges against him. This Article uses the terms “accuser,” “complainant,” “accused,” and 
“defendant” to highlight the reversal in controlling dynamics from the rape event itself: the 
passive “victim” becomes the active “accuser,” and the active “rapist” becomes the passive 
“defendant.”  
3 This Article focuses on male-to-female rape and sexual assault, but this is not 
meant to define the extent of either crime in America. Male-to-male rape is a well-
documented and prevalent problem in the United States. See Rape Crisis Center of Catawba 
County, Male Rape, 1996, http://www.rapecrisiscenter.com/education_articles_007.htm. A 
less documented issue is female-to-male rape. See id. Another underreported phenomenon, 
female-to-female rape, has received recent attention. See generally LORI B. GIRSHICK, 
WOMAN-TO-WOMAN SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2002). Nonetheless, the statistical reality in 
America is that sexual assault is directed towards females ten times more than males. Men 
Against Sexual Assault, Sexual Assault Statistics, Feb. 20, 2003, http://sa.rochester.edu/ 
masa/stats.php [hereinafter MASA]. 
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and the scene of the alleged rape as imagined by the jury. Unique to a rape 
“play,” however, an accuser cannot be sure which role the jury will assign 
to her by the time it begins its deliberations. Is she to be cast as a whore?4 A 
vengeful liar? A tease? Mentally unstable? If she has the “proper” 
background and the defendant is a stranger, can she play the role of an 
innocent Madonna whose perceived purity may result in the rarest of 
events: a guilty verdict? 
While every trial has elements of theater,5 rape and sexual assault 
cases are unique because they emphasize the gender performances of the 
accuser and the accused. Complainants who testify are not just recounting 
the events of the alleged rape. They are also defining the essential parts of 
their gender roles for the jury. Every statement, mannerism, action, and 
emotion of the accuser on the witness stand relays information about her 
gender to the jury. If the jurors deem a performance too emotional, they 
may assume the accuser is stereotypically hysterical and unreliable. If, 
however, she appears cold and calculating, the jury may believe she is a 
“gold-digger” using the criminal trial as a prequel to a lucrative civil suit. If 
she shows too much anger (as though it were possible for someone who has 
been raped to be “too angry”), the jury may see vengeance as her motive for 
“crying rape.” Which predefined gender roles the jury assigns the accuser 
and accused during the trial are important in determining whose story the 
jury will ultimately believe. 
At its core, a criminal rape trial taps into the linguistically and 
culturally founded beliefs of the jury in order to reach a desired outcome. In 
most cases of “simple rape,”6 as Susan Estrich has labeled acquaintance 
rape, the defense attempts to access certain meta-narratives about sex and 
rape to convince the jury that the alleged rape event was really consensual 
sex. These rape myths and the rhetoric of rape and sex, not statutory rules 
and procedures, are the critical pivot points for shaping the jury’s decision.7 
The trial itself is like a play where the actors and their agents fight to define 
the roles and script utilizing these meta-narratives. As Stephen Schulhofer 
has written, “[s]ocial attitudes are tenacious, and they can easily nullify the 
theories and doctrines found in the law books. The story of failed [rape law] 
                                                 
4 These different roles will be described in greater detail later in this Article. They 
are primarily derived from the scholarship of Kimberlé Crenshaw concerning rape trials and 
storytelling. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story is it Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE AND 
EN-GENDERING POWER 402, 409 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). 
5  Bernard J. Hibbits, De-scribing Law: Performance in the Constitution of 
Legality, Mar. 1996, http://www.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/describ.htm; Ariela Gross, Beyond 
Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 651-
54 (2001). 
6 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 4 (1987). 
7 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 58 (1999). 
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reforms is in part a story about the overriding importance of culture, about 
the seeming irrelevance of law.”8 
The William Kennedy Smith, Jr., Big Dan’s Tavern, Central Park 
“wilding,” and Mike Tyson trials, as well as the failed trial of Kobe Bryant, 
illustrate an important concept of law in America: the roles assigned by the 
media and jurors to the accuser and accused are fundamental to the 
outcomes of rape trials. When the defense attorneys for Kennedy Smith, Jr. 
successfully painted him as a respectable doctor from a good family and his 
accuser as an unstable money-grubber, the jury found him not guilty.9 Kobe 
Bryant’s defense team successfully deployed a similar strategy and his case 
did not even go to trial.10 In the Big Dan’s Tavern trials, the defendants 
were portrayed as wild Portuguese immigrants who represented a culture 
built on misogyny. 11  Similarly, the Central Park “wilding” cases were 
framed less as traditional rape cases than as general acts of violence by 
Black and Hispanic hordes against innocent, civilized New Yorkers who 
needed protection.12 Mike Tyson was the embodiment of the wild man who 
could not be controlled by society’s rules and the prosecution exploited that 
perception. 13  In each of these cases, and in most other rape trials in 
                                                 
8 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND 
THE FAILURE OF LAW 17 (1998). 
9 Jody Freeman, The Disciplinary Function of Rape’s Representation: Lessons 
from the Kennedy Smith and Tyson Trials, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 517, 530-33 (1993). In 
December 1991, William Kennedy Smith, Jr. became one of the first celebrities to have his 
criminal trial broadcast nationally on Court TV. Valerie Block, Court TV on Trial: 
Struggling Network Heals Ownership Rift; New Chief Works on Programming, Ad Sales, 
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Nov. 2, 1998, at 3. The trial captured the public’s attention because 
Smith was John F. Kennedy’s nephew. Smith was charged with rape, but was found not 
guilty. Freeman, supra at 530-33. 
10  Adrienne T. Washington, Bryant’s Accuser Unfairly Portrayed as False by 
Public, WASH. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2003, at B2. Kobe Bryant, a professional basketball player, 
was charged with rape for an incident at a Colorado resort. The charges against Bryant were 
dropped on the eve of trial and a settlement with his accuser was reached. 
11 LISA M. CUKLANZ, RAPE ON TRIAL: HOW THE MASS MEDIA CONSTRUCT LEGAL 
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 69-72 (1996). The Big Dan’s Tavern trials concerned a gang 
rape in a bar in New Bedford, Massachusetts in March 1983. Those responsible for the crime 
were part of the Portuguese immigrant community. The trials were televised in 1984 on 
CNN and the defendants were ultimately found guilty. Id. at 9-10. 
12 Id. at 8. The “wilding” incidents concerned groups of teenagers who molested 
and assaulted victims in Central Park. Though it was not an actual rape case, the sexual 
nature of the crimes garnered national attention. The cases were portrayed in the media as 
savage minority children preying on the civilized denizens of New York City. Id. 
13  Freeman, supra note 9, at 527-30. Mike Tyson, a professional boxer, was 
convicted of raping a beauty contestant in a hotel room. In the trial, the prosecution was able 
to capitalize on Tyson’s aggressive behavior and wild reputation to obtain a conviction. Id. 
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America, the outcomes have been determined not so much by specific 
evidentiary decisions and legal rules, but by utilizing the narrative structure 
most appealing to the jury.14  
 While feminist jurisprudential critiques and efforts at reforming 
rape law have focused on procedural and substantive defects of statutes and 
judicial decisions,15 there is a more significant factor that determines rape 
trial outcomes: what this Article terms the “burden of performance.” This 
burden, which will be described in depth below, is in addition to the burden 
of proof and persuasion already upon the prosecution. When complainants 
testify, they assume roles that put their gender identity into question. How 
they perform in these roles is fundamental to the jury’s decision-making 
process. Defense attorneys use the predefined roles and certain rhetorical 
techniques to compare a particular complainant’s experience with those in 
society’s collective consciousness. 16  Specifically, the defense takes 
advantage of a jury’s exposure to rape and pornography images and 
anecdotes. When a complainant is telling her story, she must impress a jury 
that has been inculcated with a lifetime of rape imagery and accounts, 
making the burden of performance a substantial impediment. Accusers must 
convince a jury, jaded by rape stories and pictures, that her story is 
“special” enough to warrant a guilty verdict. The end result is that 
prosecutions are doomed to fail in most situations.17 
To understand rape law reform and its failure, it is absolutely 
essential to comprehend the unique performative problems that stifle efforts 
to reduce the occurrence of rape. Existing legal scholarship has ignored 
important developments in communication theory and has omitted 
significant considerations, contributing to the failure of reform efforts. As a 
result, existing feminist and mainstream proposals to improve American 
rape law are inherently suspect. To address this existing shortcoming, this 
Article offers new theories for analyzing rape trials and rape law derived 
from the burden of performance.  
This Article argues that rape law reform must be fundamentally 
reoriented to address the problematics of performance and language that 
determine the outcomes of rape and sexual assault trials. Part I gives a brief 
account of the modern history of rape law reform and critique in the United 
States. Part II outlines the existing limited scholarship on representational 
and performative critiques of rape law. In Part III, the Article turns to a 
thought experiment derived from the scholarship of Jean Baudrillard that 
illustrates the unique nature of performances in rape trials as compared to 
                                                 
14 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
15 See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
16 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 15-57. 
17 See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
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other crimes. Part IV uses the hypothetical example in Part III to articulate 
and explore the concept of the burden of performance. In Part V, the Article 
focuses on the overriding factors that ensure the burden of performance will 
be insurmountable for most accusers. These impediments are derived from 
the scholarship on disaster pornography, sexual pornography, and the effect 
of the media’s construction of rape, sex imagery, and myths. Finally, this 
Article offers some conclusions about how the burden of performance 
fundamentally alters the discussion of American rape law reform. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RAPE LAW REFORM IN AMERICA 
The history and details of America’s attempts to reform rape law 
have been written about many times before,18 so this section is brief. A 
popular notion in the mainstream American press is that rape law has gone 
too far, that the pendulum has swung from failing to protect rape victims19 
                                                 
18 For a comprehensive history of rape law reform and proposed reforms, see 
David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317 (2000). 
19 As this Article is significantly focused on the rhetoric surrounding rape, it is 
important to consider the labels used to identify those who have been raped. The central 
conflict concerning the naming issue surrounds the transition from using the term “rape 
victim” to using “rape survivor.” See David Mills, Semantics of Rape Language vs. What’s 
“Politically Correct,” WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at B5. This linguistic transition has been 
largely driven by those who believe that the “victim” rhetoric is disempowering. See Martha 
R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation 
Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1311 n.115 (1992); Evelyn Mary Aswad, Torture by 
Means of Rape, 84 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1916 n.11 (1996); Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A 
Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 
159, 164 n.5 (1997); International Human Rights Law Group, No Justice, No Peace: 
Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 110 (1994); Metin Basoğlu, Prevention of Torture and Care of Survivors, 
270 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 606, 606 (1993); EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R. FISHER, 
BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 
17-18 (1988). Some writers have gone as far as saying the “victim” label is abusive. See 
Julie Hosking, When it Comes to Rape, Victim is a Dirty Word, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 
(Sydney, Australia), Mar. 24, 2002, at 20. “Survivor” became a preferred term because it 
was used as part of a process to move past the trauma of a sexual assault. See Rhona 
Dowdeswell, Why I Must Forgive to Get Over My Rape; Analysis, WESTERN DAILY PRESS, 
Jan. 25, 2002, at 8. Despite this movement among rape scholars to use “survivor” rhetoric, 
Andrea Dworkin presented the following argument for using “victim”: 
It’s a true word. If you were raped, you were victimized. You damned well were. You were a 
victim. It doesn’t mean you are a victim in the metaphysical sense, in your state of being, as 
an intrinsic part of your essence and existence. It means somebody hurt you. They injured 
you . . . . And if it happens to you systematically because you are born a woman, it means 
that you live in a political system that uses pain and humiliation to control and to hurt you. 
Andrea Dworkin, Woman-Hating Right and Left, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND 
THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM 28, 38 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990). 
There are also numerous people who have been raped who prefer to be called “victims.” See 
Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 308 n.6 (1995). There 
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to targeting innocent men.20 This viewpoint has been inspired by a backlash 
against political correctness and sexual harassment laws, as well as a 
general social move away from feminism.21 Opponents of rape law reform 
have had incredible success in convincing America that rape law has 
drastically changed in the last thirty years so that it now covers conduct that 
should not be criminal.22 The Dotson case, where the victim recanted her 
rape story years later, further fed the media’s portrayal of the feminist 
agenda gone too far.23  
Quite simply, the idea that rape law reform has overreached is a 
myth without any basis in fact. 24  While there may be successful 
prosecutions of innocent men, that would make rape law no different than 
any other area of criminal law.25 To single out rape law as having gone too 
far, given its incredibly low prosecution and conviction rates, is a specious 
argument. In any given year in the United States, 250,000 26  to nearly 
900,00027 attempted or completed rapes occur. It is estimated that only 
                                                                                                                 
is no easy answer to the dilemma of rape identity rhetoric. See SABINE SIELKE, READING 
RAPE: THE RHETORIC OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE 1790-
1990, at 12-14 (2002). Further, there is an oversimplified belief among some who argue that 
a positive sounding word like “survivor” creates a positive effect. See id. at 13. This Article 
uses the term “victim” because of the persuasive arguments for its use and its 
appropriateness in describing the courtroom setting. Further, in rape trials, the person 
attacked is regularly called the “victim,” rendering the word even more appropriate for 
purposes of this Article.  
20 SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 10. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 CUKLANZ, supra note 11, at 74. In April 1985, Cathleen Crowell Webb recanted 
her claims that led to the conviction of Gary Dotson for rape in 1979. Although Dotson was 
not initially released, he eventually had his time commuted and was pardoned. Dotson and 
Webb received significant media attention, went on numerous talk shows together, and 
Webb published a book about the story. Id. at 10-11. 
24 SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 10. 
25  The false conviction rates for rape are two to three percent, which is not 
different from other crimes. See MASA, supra note 3. 
26 See GREENFELD, supra note 3, at v. It is difficult to determine the exact number 
of attempted or completed rapes because of the very low rate of reporting by victims. CALLIE 
RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2001: CHANGES 2000-01 WITH 
TRENDS 1993-2001, at 10 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv01.pdf. As a 
result, a wide range of estimates for the number of rapes and sexual assaults have been given 
by various researchers. 
27 Phyllis Chesler, Book Review, 220 N.Y.L.J. 2, 2 (1998) (reviewing STEPHEN J. 
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 
(1998)).  
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sixteen percent of rapes and sexual assaults are reported to police. 28 
According to a 1993 report, of the total number of reported rapes, only two 
percent resulted in conviction and incarceration.29 Little has been altered in 
the substance and procedures of rape law in the last thirty years to justify 
the popular belief of radical change.30 Rape conviction and plea bargaining 
rates have not substantially increased and most victories for reformers have 
been “symbolic.”31 
This is not to deny that rape law in America has gone through 
numerous evidentiary and substantive changes over a longer time frame. 
The traditional elements of the crime of rape throughout most of the 
twentieth century were (1) sexual intercourse; (2) between a man and a 
woman who is not his wife; (3) achieved by force or threat of severe bodily 
harm; and (4) without her consent.32 The force requirement was a derivative 
of the older, and difficult to overcome, “utmost resistance requirement.”33 
Even in the face of specific violent threats, consent could be given through 
“voluntary” submission to the rapist.34 Thus, if a victim eventually gave up 
resisting, courts interpreted this as consent.35 Even as late as 1973, a New 
York appellate court held that the utmost resistance requirement meant that 
the jury’s vote to convict was improper.36  
Feminists such as Susan Brownmiller and Catharine MacKinnon 
attacked these outcomes and helped lead an effort to reform rape laws 
nationwide.37 In 1975, Michigan became the first state to adopt some of the 
policy changes suggested by feminists.38 Feminists achieved victories by 
getting policymakers to eliminate: the requirement that an accuser have a 
witness to corroborate the rape, the instruction to jurors to treat the 
                                                 
28 MASA, supra note 3. 
29 Deborah Fineblum Raub, Sure, People are Aware of Rape, Especially Now. But . 
. . , ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Apr. 15, 1999, at 1C. See also GREGORY M. 
MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM 8-9 
(1993). 
30 MATOESIAN, supra note 29, at 3. 
31 Id. at 17. 
32 Bryden, supra note 18, at 320-21. 
33 SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 19. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 19-20. 
36 People v. Hughes, 343 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (App. Div. 1973). 
37 SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 25. 
38 Id. at 29.  
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complainant with skepticism, and the admission of evidence of a victim’s 
sexual history.39 Other changes to the traditional definition included making 
the crime of rape gender-neutral, criminalizing all types of sexual 
penetration, and making rape within marriage illegal.40 More recently, some 
jurisdictions have begun to eliminate the force requirement in response to 
feminist criticisms of rape law.41  
However, as legislatures have broadened the definitions of rape, 
courts have continued to define rape narrowly. 42  Despite decades of 
advocacy efforts and awareness campaigns, juries continue to be skeptical 
of claims of rape and hold accusers to a higher standard than they do for 
other crimes.43 Reforms have had no effect in some jurisdictions, while 
others have shown only modest progress.44 What little success has occurred 
is largely attributable to increased cultural awareness of acquaintance rape 
rather than legal change.45  In many states, a strict requirement that the 
accuser show the defendant used actual force to threaten her effectively 
blocks convictions even in extreme cases.46 Most states do not recognize a 
verbal “no” by a complainant as determinative of non-consent. 47  Other 
states have maintained a variation of the resistance requirement that is often 
applied in the same way as its more stringent predecessor.48 Consequently, 
while a formal “utmost resistance requirement” has been removed, it is de 
facto enforced by jurors and judges in rape trials across the country.  
While the shortcomings of reform are significant, the problems of 
enforcement and application of the law stem from a different source. 
Specifically, the cultural, rhetorical, and performative issues in rape law 
continue to undermine efforts to deter and prevent rape. An important, but 
                                                 
39 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 7. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 30; Anne M. 
Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998). 
40  Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the 
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1783 (1992) 
[hereinafter Beyond Rape]. 
41 SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 32-33. 
42 Bryden, supra note 18, at 321-22. 
43 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 6. 
44 Id. at 7. 
45 Bryden, supra note 18, at 319. 
46 SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 6. 
47 Id. at 9-10. 
48 Id. at 127. 
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small contingent of legal and feminist scholars has explored these concerns 
in detail. 
II. RHETORICAL AND PERFORMANCE CRITIQUES OF RAPE 
LAW 
Traditional feminist jurisprudential critiques of rape law 
underestimate the role of language.49 Instead, emphasis is placed upon the 
inherent patriarchal structures at play and the sexist statutes used to 
determine the guilt of the defendant.50 In this way, critiques of rape trials 
are not substantially different than non-feminist critiques of other criminal 
trials. The focus is almost entirely on the “rules of the game” and the 
application of those rules, as opposed to the rhetoric and images integral to 
the outcome of the trial.51 Under such a view, rape victims do not achieve 
justice because the laws, fact-finders, and procedures control and determine 
the outcome of rape trials. This is not to say that feminists fail to address 
underlying problems of patriarchal culture and the attitudes of judges and 
jurors.52 However, those criticisms are usually limited to describing how 
culture shapes the law and decision-making of various actors in the rape 
trial.53 This is quite different than criticizing the rhetoric, representations, 
and performances of the actors in the trial and those used by the media. As a 
result, the efforts to reform rape law described in the previous section have 
not focused on the linguistic elements shaping rape trial outcomes.54  
Even when reform efforts have been designed to limit certain 
narrative strategies by the defense, as in the case of rape shield laws, 
attorneys have been able to accomplish the same goals through non-
controversial lines of inquiry.55 Instead of explicitly exploring an accuser’s 
sexual history, a lawyer could re-victimize the complainant through subtle, 
but still dehumanizing, cross-examinations. 56  Most often, this process 
occurs through the defense using physical evidence like clothing and 
appearance to state what could not be expressed through direct argument. 
                                                 
49 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 10. 
50 MATOESIAN, supra note 29, at 18. 
51 Id. at 20. 
52 CUKLANZ, supra note 11, at 15. 
53 Id. 
54 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 10. 
55 JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND 
POWER 137 (1998). 
56 Id. 
2006]  To Catch a Sex Thief 445 
 
Showing the accuser’s provocative lingerie can serve the same function as 
branding her a “slut.” Talking about her actions leading up to the rape can 
serve to show that she was “asking for it,” even without a thorough 
investigation of her sexual history. Though some reform has targeted 
rhetorical change, it has failed to address the problems in a systematic 
fashion.  
Andrew Taslitz has identified “storytelling theory” as a method for 
better understanding what occurs at a rape trial.57 However, his ideas on the 
communicative aspects of rape trials have been virtually ignored by the 
legal community.58 Under Taslitz’s theory, “the story of a case must be told 
in a way as to satisfy a jury’s needs for narrative coherence and fidelity.”59 
Coherence is the internal consistency of a story so that it is logical. 60 
Fidelity is determined by how well the story appeals to a juror’s sense of 
reality. 61  Storytelling theory requires that changes in underlying meta-
narratives be incremental because the new stories must replace the old 
while still maintaining a connection to the previous stories.62 This means 
that feminist stories of rape can only be added piecemeal and cannot be 
presumed to win over jurors by force of argument alone. While I adopt a 
slightly different theory than Taslitz, his description of rape trials provides 
an excellent starting point for understanding how rhetoric determines jury 
decisions. 
Taslitz identifies four underlying rape story narratives that 
dominate trials: silenced voices, bullying, black beasts, and a little more 
persuading. 63  The “silenced voices” narrative holds that rape victims’ 
voices are effectively neutralized in the rape trial process.64 The result is 
that victims’ stories are lost in the procedure and arguments of the trial 
structure. Primarily, rape victims are unable to have their complex and 
nuanced tales heard in a meaningful sense by the jury. Instead, their stories 
are reduced to the basic cultural scripts of how the jurors believe rape 
                                                 
57 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 15. 
58  As of October 28, 2005, a search on the LEXIS database under U.S. Law 
Reviews and Journals shows Taslitz’s book on the subject has been almost exclusively cited 
by Taslitz himself and a few brief mentions by other authors. No recent reviews of rape law 
by other major scholars have significantly engaged Taslitz’s work. 
59 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 15. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 17. 
63 Id. at 19-36. 
64 Id. at 19. 
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occurs. This process extends from the trial to include media coverage of 
rape as well.65 Complainant narratives are often reduced to sound bites and 
defense counsel tales are often prominent in news stories.66 
The “bullying” narrative is an extension of America’s culture of 
masculinity.67 Taslitz argues that because male aggression is encouraged 
and rewarded by mainstream society, there is an acceptance of similar 
behavior in sexual conquests. 68  Occasionally, however, the bullying 
narrative can be used by the prosecution to effectively paint the defendant 
as the aggressor. The Central Park “wilding” story represents one such 
example where the media portrayed minority teenagers as bullies that 
needed to be controlled and punished.69 
Taslitz’s third narrative, “black beasts,” is the one story that works 
exclusively for the prosecution. The concept of black beasts is derived from 
historical notions that Black men are walking phallic symbols who are 
dangerous to the community at large.70 The black beasts narrative is best 
typified by the famous Scottsboro trials in the 1930s, where Black teenagers 
in the South were convicted for rape and sentenced to death.71 Because they 
had allegedly attacked Whites, they were prime targets for the black beasts 
myth. After numerous appeals and three decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court,72 the defendants were freed, but they had served between 
six and nineteen years in prison.73 The Central Park “wilding” stories were 
also indicative of the black beasts narrative, and the case demonstrates the 
way bullying and black beasts stories can intersect and reinforce each 
other.74 The corollary to the black beast narrative is that Black complainants 
are viewed as effectively “nonrapable” and even less likely to be believed 
than their White counterparts.75 
                                                 
65 Id. at 23. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 25. 
68 Id. at 25-26. 
69 Id. at 28. 
70 Id. at 28-29. 
71 Id. at 29-30. 
72 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 
(1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
73 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 30. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 32-33. 
2006]  To Catch a Sex Thief 447 
 
The fourth and final theme is “a little more persuading.” This 
perspective equates rape with seduction. 76  The idea of “a little more 
persuading” can be found prominently in Sigmund Freud’s belief, at least 
according to some scholars, that the unconscious causes an accuser to 
surrender to rape.77 Under this view, Freud believed that if someone really 
wanted to resist a rape, she would, and the failure to do so was consent by 
the unconscious mind.78 This narrative significantly contributes to putting 
the burden on complainants to show that they took every conceivable action 
to prevent being raped even when utmost resistance is no longer required by 
law. Men are protected under such a narrative because they are justified in 
exercising a little more persuasion in light of clear resistance and a firm 
“no.” 
Susan Ehrlich’s scholarship supplements Taslitz’s storytelling 
analysis through an understanding of “talk” about rape.79 Ehrlich is not an 
American legal scholar, and her scholarship has been overlooked by legal 
scholars.80 Ehrlich argues that “language is the primary vehicle through 
which cultural and institutional ideologies are transmitted in legal 
settings.”81 The statements and “talk” of witnesses are mediated and filtered 
through the legal, cultural, and institutional norms of the courtroom. 82 
Because these underlying ideologies are heavily gendered, the “talk” of the 
courtroom reinforces and replicates the more systemic dialogue of 
patriarchy.83 Under this view, language is not neutral and not all speakers 
are served equally in any given discourse.84 
                                                 
76 Id. at 33. 
77 Id. at 33-34. 
78 Id. 
79  SUSAN EHRLICH, REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL CONSENT 4 
(2001). 
80 As of November 24, 2005, a search in the LEXIS database under U.S. Law 
Reviews and Journals shows almost no mention of Ehrlich’s academic writing, except in one 
book review. 
81 EHRLICH, supra note 79, at 4. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 12. It should be noted that Ehrlich does not rely on the much maligned and 
controversial Sapir-Whorf hypothesis to reach this conclusion. According to Ehrlich, the 
“Sapir-Whorf hypothesis holds that the grammatical and lexical structure of a given 
language has a powerful mediating influence on the ways that speakers of that language 
come to view the world.” Id. at 12. Instead, she uses Deborah Cameron’s work to support her 
argument. Id. at 12-13. 
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Ehrlich adopts a conception of the relationship between gender and 
language known as critical theory.85 Primarily, she relies on the work of 
Deborah Cameron, who argues that linguistic practices inform and create 
social identities.86 Using Cameron’s theories, Ehrlich argues that gender 
identities are performative and that gender is not something people simply 
have, but rather something they constantly do by making linguistic moves.87 
Styles of communication, mannerisms, and ways of holding oneself all 
convey and form a gender identity. Within the legal sphere, the heavily 
coercive and rigid structures of law constrain these linguistic choices.88 
Accordingly, the law “has the capacity to impose and affirm culturally 
powerful definitions of social reality.”89  
Ehrlich cites the William Kennedy Smith, Jr. rape trial as one 
example of the principle that rhetoric and culture, not law, often change not 
just the result, but also the way procedures and practices are followed in a 
rape trial. 90  Specifically, the judge permitted the jurors to assess the 
accuser’s clothing under the auspices of looking for stains or damage.91 In 
contrast, the prosecution was not permitted to admit evidence that the 
defendant had been accused of sexually assaulting three other people in the 
previous ten years.92 The judge, in making these rulings, adopted patriarchal 
conceptions of gender identity that were not so much the letter of the law, 
but rather his own predilections about gender and rape.93 Ehrlich believes 
these practices and “meanings and interpretations” of laws are at least as 
important as the supposed substance of the law in understanding rape 
trials.94  
This example by Ehrlich is consistent with most feminist critiques 
of rape law. However, the problems do not end at the point of shaping 
procedural outcomes. There is a larger battle taking place at a rape trial 
                                                 
85 Id. at 5. “Critical theory” in the context of feminist literature, as used by Ehrlich, 
rejects static notions of gender in favor of constructivist and dynamic meanings of gender 
identity. Id. 
86 DEBORAH CAMERON, VERBAL HYGIENE 15-16 (1995). 
87 EHRLICH, supra note 79, at 5. 
88 Id. at 11. 
89 Id. at 18. 
90 Id. at 26.  
91 Id. at 26-27. 
92 Id. at 27. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 28. 
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whereby the accuser must assume a performative role to garner credibility 
with the jury. In the years before Jody Freeman became a prominent 
environmental law professor, she made this observation about the Kennedy 
Smith, Jr. trial:  
Implicit in any seemingly neutral portrayal of how men and 
women “are” is an argument about how they “should” be . . . . 
The power of representation reaches its height somewhere in this 
vicious circle of consciousness control, where social construction 
is mistaken for nature and interpretation masquerades as truth.95 
Ultimately, the Kennedy Smith, Jr. trial demonstrated that although 
accusers can try to occupy a safe space in their representations, they cannot 
control the way audiences, and specifically juries, perceive them.96 There is 
no neutral role to assume for someone alleging rape. There are only 
different, culturally-defined, normalized roles that will be developed further 
by prosecutors and defense lawyers. 
Kimberlé Crenshaw has argued that accusers inevitably become 
pigeonholed into a limited number of categorical stereotypes including “the 
whore, the tease, the vengeful liar, the mentally or emotionally unstable, or, 
in a few instances, the madonna.”97 Once the accusers become part of those 
cultural identities, it is extremely difficult for them to escape these roles in 
the eyes of the jury. A whore is still a whore even if she takes off the 
makeup and becomes an upstanding citizen. A vengeful liar will always 
have motives for what she is saying and the jury will always doubt her 
words. The unstable accuser is unreliable in her recounting of events 
because her narrative is constructed through a mentally ill framework. 
Because gender identity is performative, the jury holds the perceived past 
performances of an accuser’s identity against her.  
The roles assigned by the defense fit into scripts that determine 
legal outcomes in rape trials.98 The Madonna role is usually reserved for 
victims of rape by a stranger, or what Estrich calls “real rape.” 99  The 
Madonna role is essentially that of the pure, innocent victim100 who has 
neither sexual desire nor history. However, Taslitz has prosecuted a case 
where the defense was able to use a victim’s sexual innocence against her in 
                                                 
95 Freeman, supra note 9, at 538-39. 
96 Id. at 539. 
97 Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 409. 
98 Freeman, supra note 9, at 539. 
99 ESTRICH, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
100 Crenshaw, supra note 4, at 430. 
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order to attain a verdict of not guilty.101 In that case, the defense effectively 
argued that the victim’s naïveté was indicative of shame following an act of 
consensual sex. She was lying in an attempt to regain her chastity. 
Therefore, no role is safe for a complainant, and she has little choice as to 
which role she will play. The adversarial system ensures the defense will 
explore whatever role is beneficial to its side and may even ascribe several 
roles to one accuser. 
This Article further explores the performative critique offered by 
Taslitz, Ehrlich, and Crenshaw and supplements the arguments they have 
made about rape trials. While their general criticisms are helpful, they do 
not address the degree to which representation and performance alter the 
outcomes in rape trials. This Article seeks to push legal scholarship further 
by arguing that performance, and not rule-making, should be the focus of 
future rape law reform and critique. To do otherwise virtually assures that 
progress in the fight against rape will be as slow as it has been during the 
last thirty years.  
III. SIMULATED CRIMES AND JEAN BAUDRILLARD’S 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
Comparing rape law to other areas of criminal law illuminates why 
rape law reform has failed. While several scholars have noted the 
similarities between theft and rape, none have compared the two crimes 
from a rhetorical and performative perspective. Richard Posner, in Sex and 
Reason, termed an average forcible rapist as a “sex thief” and outlined 
many similarities between the two crimes.102  Consistent with this label, 
Posner argued that sex should be treated as a commodity and rape should be 
viewed as theft of that commodity. Donald Dripps offered a similar, yet 
                                                 
101 TASLITZ, supra note 7, at 3. 
102 RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 182 (1992). Posner’s perspective offers 
numerous benefits to the feminist analysis of rape when compared to the traditional 
definitions adopted by courts and legislatures. Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the 
Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2430-31 (1993) [hereinafter Taste for the Absurd]. It eliminates 
the “utmost resistance standard” and its watered-down variants. Further, Posner’s 
commodity theory puts emphasis on autonomy and choice, two values that would normally 
be embraced by feminists in a rape law discussion. Id. at 2431. However, Robin West has 
outlined some of the problems with Posner’s particular comparisons between rape and theft 
law in her review of Sex and Reason. Id. West argued that Posner’s commodity theory of 
rape fell prey to the problem of legitimation. Id. Because Posner takes a strong view of 
autonomy, he is unwilling to support any attempt to criminalize rape by fraud or coercion. 
West was concerned that the failure to criminalize coercive sex meant that those acts became 
legitimated by their legality. Id. at 2431-32. The end result of Posner’s silence concerning 
other crimes is that society would remain blind to coercive sex acts even when there were 
“grossly unequal distributions of sexual power.” Id. at 2431 (emphasis added). 
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distinct, commodity theory of rape and sexual assault.103  Susan Estrich, 
representing a potentially feminist perspective, has also proposed a rape law 
that uses a similar commodity analysis. 104  While there are certainly 
differences between rape and robbery in these commodity theories,105 there 
                                                 
103 Beyond Rape, supra note 40, at 1780. Dripps, like Posner, believes rape should 
be viewed from the perspective of preserving sexual autonomy and uses a commodity 
perspective to support his argument. Id. at 1786-87. However, Dripps’ specific theory has 
advantages over Posner’s, in that it does more to remove the force requirement and squarely 
puts the emphasis on consent. Robin West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on 
Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1447 (1993) [hereinafter Legitimating the 
Illegitimate]. Further, Dripps’ particular theory of consent does not allow a defendant to 
achieve consent through threats of force. Id. at 1447-48. However, as with Posner’s theory, 
West identified several important shortcomings. The problem of legitimation persists 
because Dripps seeks to protect sexual acts that are coerced in many instances. Id. at 1452. 
Further, West makes an argument that would apply to both theories: treating sex as a 
commodity has historically been a disservice to feminism and fails to describe the experience 
of rape. Id. at 1449-51. Dripps’ theory is also problematic because it includes an intent 
standard that creates an exception that may swallow the rule. In his model statute for 
sexually motivated assault and sexual expropriation, Dripps includes the relatively standard 
phrase of “purposely or knowingly.” Beyond Rape, supra note 40, at 1807. The problem with 
Dripps’ statute is that the intent standard allows the same type of defense arguments as the 
force and consent standards he is critiquing. The emphasis on the defendant’s knowledge 
allows defenses to incorporate rape myths because they are likely to be part of the 
defendant’s state of mind. If the defendant believed that the accuser wanted “rough sex,” 
then the rape would not constitute criminal conduct under the model statute. 
104 ESTRICH, supra note 6, at 102-03. Specifically, she argues that the rules that 
govern the exchange of property should be used in rape cases. Id. Unlike Posner’s and 
Dripps’ proposal, Estrich’s proposal seeks to criminalize coercive sex situations. Id. 
Unfortunately, unlike Dripps, Estrich never details how her proposal could be implemented 
into law. SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 84. While avoiding the problem of legitimation, 
Estrich does not offer a developed statute that can be examined for other policy 
shortcomings. 
105 A major problem with these commodity theories relates to the assumptions they 
make about sex and rape. While West was very critical of the notion of commodifying sex, 
she did not fully explore the notions of restitution and fungibility as they relate to sex. 
Legitimating the Illegitimate, supra note 103, at 1449-51; Panel Discussion, Men, Women, 
and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 154 (1994). While Dripps is careful not to adopt a 
commodity theory that would “smuggle in a normative term,” he cannot avoid certain 
inherent assumptions about the nature of commodities. Beyond Rape, supra note 40, at 1787. 
In the case of robbery, restitution is normally possible. Whatever goods are stolen can be 
returned. There may be instances where the goods stolen have been damaged or destroyed, 
but the principle that they can be replaced generally applies. Even in the case of objects with 
high sentimental value, there is no theft of a person’s identity in robbery so there is some 
measure of fungibility. Dripps seemingly recognizes this shortcoming of the analogy and 
thus moves from an analogy of jewelry theft to a theft of personal services. Id. at 1801-02. 
Under this perspective, however, the comparison is still problematic. Unlike most theft of 
services cases, rape is taken without any illusion of fair compensation. Theft of services is 
more analogous to an incident where a prostitute does not receive payment. To equate such 
an event to a rape is a strained metaphor. Rape is unique precisely because compensation is 
impossible. There can be no way to make someone whole again. Even the unpaid prostitute 
can receive restitution, but a rape victim cannot. While Dripps’ caveat that his claim is not 
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are also important distinctions in performance aspects. To accomplish a 
performative comparison of rape and robbery, this Article uses a 
hypothetical example from Jean Baudrillard. To fully understand the 
thought experiment, it is first necessary to be familiar with Baudrillard’s 
worldview. 
A. Jean Baudrillard 
Jean Baudrillard has been called everything from the “pop-star”106 
to the “pimp” 107  of the postmodern age. 108  The easiest access point to 
understand Baudrillard’s unique writing is to explore the concept of 
hyperreality, a term that Baudrillard coined. 109  The hyperreal world is 
composed of a simulation and can be viewed as a society based entirely on 
                                                                                                                 
normative addresses this concern to a degree, the inherent problem with a commodity view 
of rape is that it applies the analogous square peg to a round hole. Even if some contract and 
theft law is helpful for understanding rape, that connection does not mean a commodity 
theory is a desirable method for understanding and constructing rape law. To do so will 
always leave some dangerous assumptions built into statutes and in the rhetoric surrounding 
the issue. 
106 Postmodernism: Baudrillard, http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/ 
cshtml/general/pomodet.html#Baudrillard (last modified June 21, 2003). Baudrillard’s 
mainstream notoriety is probably due mostly to his connection to the Matrix movies by the 
Wachowski brothers. The brothers drew inspiration from Baudrillard’s scholarship and even 
featured one of his books in the first movie in the trilogy. See Richard G. Smith, Lights, 
Camera, Action: Baudrillard and the Performance of Representations, 2 INT’L J. OF 
BAUDRILLARD STUDIES (2005), available at http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/ 
vol2_1/smith.htm. 
107 Suzanne Moore, Getting a Bit of the Other: The Pimps of Postmodernism, in 
MALE ORDER: UNWRAPPING MASCULINITY 165, 180 (Rowena Chapman & Jonathan 
Rutherford eds.,1988). 
108 Baudrillard has been identified as “the male French theorist who most explicitly 
and most frontally adopts an adversarial relation to feminism.” Jane Gallop, French Theory 
and the Seduction of Feminism, in MEN IN FEMINISM 111, 113 (Alice Jardine ed., 1987). This 
rather harsh criticism by Gallop concerning Baudrillard’s work has largely been responsible 
for his almost total irrelevance to feminist literature. Baudrillard says many provocative, 
arguably misogynist things in his various works and he has rarely been identified as a friend 
to feminism. This is significant to this Article as Baudrillard’s writings figure prominently in 
what is, at its core, a feminist critique of rape law. For a full defense of Baudrillard in regard 
to his statements about feminism, see VICTORIA GRACE, BAUDRILLARD’S CHALLENGE: A 
FEMINIST READING (2000). Grace’s excellent work handles the various objections and 
arguments made by Gallop and others about Baudrillard’s relationship to feminism and 
eventually concludes that feminism has much to gain from examining and utilizing 
Baudrillard’s scholarship. 
109 GRACE, supra note 108, at 25. 
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performance.110 Hence, it has significant relevance to the larger themes of 
this Article. 
Baudrillard suggests that there are three levels of simulation.111 The 
first level of simulation is one where there is a copy of an original.112 The 
copy is not detailed or sophisticated enough to be mistaken for the 
original.113 Paintings and maps can be examples of this first level.114 No one 
would mistake a road map for the actual reality of the world, but it is, 
nonetheless, a representation that can be used to understand the layout of 
the real world.  
The second level of simulation is where the simulation becomes so 
perfect that it is indistinguishable from the real world.115 Baudrillard uses 
the analogy of a Borges fable about a world map to help the reader 
understand this second level.116 In this case, the map is life-sized and so 
perfect that it looks like a duplicate of the real world. It is an identical copy 
such that you could traverse the map just as you would travel in the real 
world. While no such map has ever existed, it is a metaphor for 
understanding the second level of simulation. 
The third level of simulation is one where there is a copy, but no 
original.117 This world is what Baudrillard terms the hyperreal world in 
which we live. 118 Perhaps the easiest, but not most complete, analogy for 
this third level is found in online virtual worlds.119 People play games in 
fantastic worlds that lack any current or historical connection to reality, but 
are nonetheless “real.” Virtual people have virtual possessions, travel 
through virtual worlds, and have virtual experiences. In the third order of 
simulation, the model precedes the real because there is no referent for the 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 RICHARD J. LANE, JEAN BAUDRILLARD 30 (2000); Brian F. Fitzgerald, Software 
as Discourse: The Power of Intellectual Property in Digital Architecture, 18 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 337, 357 (2000). 
112 LANE, supra note 111, at 30. 
113  JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION 86 (Sheila Faria Glasner 
trans. 1994) (1981) [hereinafter SIMULACRA]. 
114 LANE, supra note 111, at 86. 
115 Id. at 30. 
116 SIMULACRA, supra note 113, at 1-3. 
117 LANE, supra note 111, at 86-87. 
118 SIMULACRA, supra note 113, at 12. 
119 LANE, supra note 111, at 30. 
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real.120 Baudrillard finds little difference between the virtual worlds created 
in the computer realm and the real world in which we live. The 
representations and models that construct our understanding of the world, 
largely through mass media, are really just simulations without an 
original.121 The difference between virtual and “real” is more slight than 
most would expect. Given the various cultural filters through which 
information is interpreted in modern America, the ability to know what is 
“real” is often quite difficult. For Baudrillard, the various obstacles to 
accessing the “real” render it a simulated world of the third order.  
To the lay Baudrillard reader encountering such ideas for the first 
time, these concepts probably seem a bit unusual. Some of this is surely due 
to the condensed nature of these explanations, in addition to the varying 
analyses of Baudrillard’s work. Baudrillard’s writing vacillates between the 
literal and performatively provocative. 122  As a result, there are often 
concepts that appear to be more extreme and less serious than many readers 
take them to be.123 This has resulted in numerous misinterpretations and 
misreadings of his scholarship,124  even by people known as Baudrillard 
scholars.125  
For now, this Aritcle seeks to take Baudrillard on his own terms so 
as to use his tools to explore concepts of representation.126 Engaging in a 
                                                 
120  Maria Grahn-Farley, The Law Room: Hyperrealist Jurisprudence & 
Postmodern Politics, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 29, 45-46 (2001). 
121 Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
621, 668 (2004); Heather Lauren Hughes, Same-Sex Marriage and Simulacra: Exploring 
Conceptions of Equality, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 237, 239 (1998). 
122 LANE, supra note 111, at 97. 
123 Id. 
124 GRACE, supra note 108, at 31. 
125 Douglas Kellner fits within this category. While recognized as a Baudrillard 
scholar, he spends most of his time attacking Baudrillard’s work based on his rather peculiar, 
science-fiction type reading of Baudrillard. His attacks have probably unfairly discredited 
Baudrillard, but are nonetheless taken as credible because he is viewed as an authority on 
Baudrillard. See id. at 33-34. 
126 It is also important to realize that Baudrillard’s ideas about simulation are 
ethically neutral. That is, for Baudrillard, hyperreality is becoming the natural order of things 
in American society, but that transformation is not a “good” or “evil” process. LANE, supra 
note 111, at 100. This is in contrast to similar theories, like Guy Debord’s conception of the 
spectacle being the defining event for a modern world. For Debord, spectacles are something 
to be challenged and resisted. Id. For Baudrillard, simulation just is—there is no way to go 
back to what was before, so it is foolish to try. Id. Further, the statement that we cannot 
access the real does not negate the existence of “real” suffering and “real” horror. Nicholas 
Spencer, The “Law” of Simulated War in Gravity’s Rainbow, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
681, 695 (1999). 
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thought experiment of Baudrillard’s design can help to highlight the 
quandaries and paradoxes of rape law. By adopting Baudrillard’s 
perspective for at least a little while, we can see how performance 
substantially interacts with criminal law. 
B. Baudrillard’s Thought Experiment 
In Simulacra and Simulations, Jean Baudrillard offers a story and a 
strategy to reveal that law and order are just systems of third order 
simulation. 127  Baudrillard has identified a resistance strategy of hyper-
simulation.128 By following the simulation to its logical endpoint, the hyper-
simulator demonstrates a fatal flaw in the design of the larger simulation 
structure. 129  In this instance, Baudrillard uses the example of an armed 
robbery to expose the illusory nature of law’s grip on reality.130 He argues 
that a hyper-simulated robbery, where all the events appear to be real, but 
are only simulated, can challenge the simulation of law in modern 
societies.131 Below is the thought experiment from Baudrillard. Baudrillard 
is not a lawyer and does not have any legal training, but he does offer a 
fairly accurate assessment of how most Western legal systems would react 
to an attempt to simulate an armed robbery. Without understanding 
concepts like “intent” and “mens rea,” Baudrillard is nevertheless able to 
give a plausible narrative about how a simulated robbery would be received 
by a criminal justice system.  
This Article attempts to replicate the example by applying the story 
to a fact pattern of a hypothetical rape. The stories are rather long, so they 
are side-by-side below to make the narratives easier to compare. In the left 
column is Baudrillard’s original story of a simulated armed robbery. In the 
right column is my version of a simulated rape.  
 
For example: it would be 
interesting to see whether the 
repressive apparatus would not 
react more violently to a 
simulated holdup than to a real 
holdup. Because the latter does 
nothing but disturb the order of 
things, the right of property, 
 
For example: it would be 
interesting to see whether the 
repressive apparatus would not 
react more violently to a 
simulated rape than a real rape. 
Because the latter does nothing 
but disturb the order of things, 
the right of sexual consent, 
                                                 
127 SIMULACRA, supra note 113, at 20. 
128 Id. at 19-27. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 20-21. 
131 Id. at 19-27. 
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whereas the former attacks the 
reality principle itself. 
Transgression and violence are 
less serious because they only 
contest the distribution of the 
real. Simulation is infinitely 
more dangerous because it 
always leaves open to 
supposition that, above and 
beyond its object, law and order 
themselves might be nothing 
more than simulation. 
 
But the difficulty is 
proportional to the danger. How 
to feign a violation and put it to 
the test? Simulate a robbery in a 
large store; how to persuade 
security that it is a simulated 
robbery? There is no 
“objective” difference: the 
gestures, the signs are the same 
as for the real robbery, the signs 
do not lean to one side or 
another. To the established 
order they are always of the 
order of the real. 
 
Organize a fake holdup. Verify 
that your weapons are harmless, 
and take the most trustworthy 
hostage, so that no human life 
will be in danger (or one lapses 
into the criminal). Demand a 
ransom, and make it so that the 
operation creates as much 
commotion as possible—in 
short, remain close to the 
“truth,” in order to test the 
reaction of the apparatus to a 
perfect simulacrum. You won’t 
be able to do it: the network of 
artificial signs will become 
inextricably mixed up with real 
elements (a policeman will 
really fire on sight; a client of 
the bank will faint and die of a 
whereas the former attacks the 
reality principle itself. 
Transgression and violence are 
less serious because they only 
contest the distribution of the 
real. Simulation is infinitely 
more dangerous because it 
always leaves open to 
supposition that, above and 
beyond its object, law and order 
themselves might be nothing 
more than simulation. 
 
But the difficulty is 
proportional to the danger. How 
to feign a violation and put it to 
the test? Simulate a rape in a 
private, but visible location; 
how to persuade the police that 
it is a simulated rape? There is 
no “objective” difference: the 
gestures, the signs are the same 
as for the real rape, the signs do 
not lean to one side or another. 
To the established order they 
are always of the order of the 
real. 
 
Organize a fake rape. Verify 
that your weapon is harmless, 
use a willing partner as the 
simulated victim, so that 
consent is not an issue (or one 
lapses into the criminal). 
Demand every perversion your 
partner wants, and make it so 
the operation creates as much 
commotion as possible—in 
short, remain close to the 
“truth,” in order to test the 
reaction of the apparatus to a 
perfect simulacrum. You won’t 
be able to do it: a network of 
artificial signs will become 
inextricably mixed up with real 
elements (the police will really 
threaten you with their 
                                                                                                                 
132 SIMULACRA, supra note 113, at 20-21. 
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heart attack; one will actually 
pay you the phony ransom), in 
short you will immediately find 
yourself once again, without 
wishing it, in the real, one of 
whose functions is precisely to 
devour any attempt at 
simulation, to reduce everything 
to the real—that is, to the 
established order itself, well 
before institutions and justice 
come into play. 
 
It is necessary to see in this 
impossibility of isolating the 
process of simulation the 
weight of an order that cannot 
see and conceive of anything 
but the real, because it cannot 
function anywhere else. The 
simulation of an offense, if it is 
established as such, will either 
be less severely punished 
(because it has no 
“consequences”) or punished as 
an offense against the judicial 
system (for example if one sets 
in motion a police operation 
“for nothing”)—but never as a 
simulation since it is precisely 
as such that no equivalence 
with the real is possible and 
hence no repression either.132 
weapons; a witness may tackle 
and attack you; your partner 
will actually stop struggling 
because of your threatening 
demands), in short you will 
immediately find yourself once 
again, without wishing it, in the 
real, one of whose functions is 
precisely to devour any attempt 
at simulation, to reduce 
everything to the real—that is, 
to the established order itself, 
well before institutions and 
justice come into play. 
 
It is necessary to see in this 
impossibility of isolating the 
process of simulation the 
weight of an order that cannot 
see and conceive of anything 
but the real, because it cannot 
function anywhere else. The 
simulation of a rape, if it is 
established as such, will not be 
punished because, as a 
simulation, it is welcomed and 
encouraged by the real. The 
very essence of a defense 
strategy is just to argue that the 
rape was not “real,” but was 
just a simulation of rape. Thus, 
the system of simulation 
cannot be resisted through a 
hyper-simulation approach. 
 
 
The critical difference between Baudrillard’s example and the rape 
narrative is in the way each crime is treated by the criminal justice system. 
A simulated robbery, though not appearing objectively different from the 
real robbery, may still contain “artificial signs.” The hypothetical 
defendants in such a case raise a jury question that is not easily handled by 
modern justice systems: what happens if the defendants were just faking it? 
If they can actually show everyone was “in” on the robbery, then what 
crime has taken place? Under American law, the defendants in a simulated 
armed robbery would lack the necessary mens rea for a crime of armed 
robbery. Hyper-simulation of robbery, within Baudrillard’s paradigm, is an 
oppositional, resistance strategy because it can expose law’s limited ability 
to access the real intent of the parties. According to Baudrillard, though a 
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hyper-simulated robbery may “be punished for either falling short of 
success or being too successful,” it will not be punished for “being a 
simulation itself.”133 There is no crime for simulating a robbery and if the 
crime was truly simulated, the defendants would have no intent to commit 
robbery. Hyper-simulation of a crime “leaves open the supposition that, 
above and beyond its object, law and order themselves might be nothing but 
simulation.”134 
Whereas a simulated robbery may be distinguished from a real 
robbery, the simulated rape story is indistinguishable from the average 
simple rape as presented to a jury. That is, the defense strategy in most rape 
cases is to argue that the rape was simulated. Defense attorneys do not use 
the term “simulated,” but when they say “it was just rough sex” or “bruises 
are normal,” they are saying the rape was only an illusion, a facsimile, a 
copy, a simulation. While a defense lawyer may never have heard of Jean 
Baudrillard, he or she is effectively engaging in a strategy identified by 
Baudrillard: hyper-simulation. Hyper-simulation is commonplace in simple 
rape trials. Hyper-simulation cannot offer a method for exposing fallacies of 
rape law, because it is already part of the process. Understanding why rape 
and robbery are different in this regard is crucial to understanding some of 
the unique representational problems in rape law.  
Simulated crimes are rare, or nonexistent, but the possibility of a 
simulated crime gives us a window into understanding how intent standards 
are problematic in Western law systems. Reading someone’s mind, as intent 
rules attempt to do, is often a difficult undertaking for fact-finders. When 
the accused tries to problematize the very concept of intent (as in the 
simulated armed robbery case), there is a troubling epistemological gap for 
a fact-finder to overcome. While such cases of simulation do not really 
exist, the problem at the margins of a defendant who does not easily fit into 
the categories of “intended to do it” and “did not intend to do it” is 
illustrative of deeper problems of criminal law.  
IV. THE BURDEN OF PERFORMANCE 
Many scholars have characterized a rape trial as a trial of the 
accuser135 to emphasize the ordeal the complainant must survive before, 
during, and after a trial. The label of “trying the victim” is also meant to 
emphasize the ways in which an accuser has her sexual history brought 
before the jury, even when rape shield laws are in place, while the 
defendant does not have to go through a similar ordeal. 136  There is, 
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however, an important way in which complainants are tried in rape cases, 
beyond the usual methods described. Accusers carry an extra burden above 
and beyond most victims of crime: the burden of performance. 
The burden of performance is the difficulty witnesses have in 
persuading a jury by the force of their testimony. The persuasion that takes 
place is not based on logic or reason. Rather, it depends on the ability of the 
witness to define her character role and provide a cogent story with fidelity 
to the jury.137 To successfully overcome the burden of performance the 
narrative must fit within the script of the trial and the larger rape meta-
narratives.138 
In the normal and simulated robbery trials, the burden of proof is on 
the prosecutor. In the simulated robbery trial, a burden of performance also 
lies on the defendant. The defendant must persuade a skeptical jury that he 
or she was actually simulating an armed robbery despite the large array of 
physical evidence linking him or her to the crime. However, the robber will 
be able to point to other evidence to corroborate his or her defense. 
Evidence of planning the simulation, guns without ammunition, and 
testimony from the simulated hostage all serve to corroborate the 
defendant’s unusual tale. The defendant must persuade the jury that the 
crime was not “real,” but only a simulation. The burden of performance is 
squarely upon the simulated robber as his or her story is likely to be against 
the accepted tales of how robberies occur in the real world. 
In a trial for a simulated rape, the burdens are a bit different. The 
burden of proof is still, as always, on the prosecution. However, in the 
average simple rape trial, the burden of performance is on the accuser and 
the prosecution.139 The accuser must prove that the rape was “real” and that 
there was no consensual sex or simulated rape. With only two witnesses to 
the alleged crime, the accused and the accuser, the accuser must establish 
what can rarely be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial usually 
revolves around a single event of which there is almost never any visual or 
audio record. Physical evidence is often limited to issues of whether there 
was an exchange of bodily fluids and does not usually weigh on the issue of 
consent.140 In cases where the complainant ultimately submitted to avoid 
further harm, there is unlikely to be any corroborating bruises or injury. If 
there is evidence of physical harm from a rape kit, it may not fully counter a 
defense strategy describing the alleged rape event as “rough,” but 
ultimately, consensual sex. The defense can always argue that the rape was 
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simulated in that the accuser either wanted or did not object to manhandling 
and the use of some force. The evidence can color the jury’s assessment of 
the competing narratives about the alleged rape event, but a credibility 
determination is an essential part of almost every rape trial jury verdict.141 
As a result, oral testimony is the lens through which jurors attempt to access 
and comprehend the happenings of an alleged rape event. 
As explained earlier, the performance is also gender-based. The 
accuser must perform within a limited selection of roles and according to 
the scripts defined by culture. When someone is painted into a defined 
position, and the number of “good” alternatives is limited, escape from the 
larger narrative is difficult. Accusers remain “vengeful” or “whores” no 
matter what the prosecutors do in an effort to rehabilitate credibility. The 
different roles often create a double bind for complainants. If they cannot 
justify their reactions in a cold, logical manner, they are seen as flighty or 
unstable, and thus, unreliable.142 If, however, they appear too confident and 
aware, they may be seen as gold-digging, hoping to seek damages in a 
subsequent civil suit, especially if the defendant is wealthy.143 Only in those 
instances when the prosecution can utilize other rape myths like black 
beasts can she fit a role amenable to a conviction. Consequently, the accuser 
is forced to overcome a very high threshold to prove that the defendant 
raped her and that the sex was not consensual. Even though the defendant is 
the one arguing that the rape was simulated, the jury is more likely to 
believe the story of simulation than in the robbery case. 
The accuser’s performance is complicated by the differences 
between “real” rape and “simple” rape. Real rapes entail a higher burden in 
proving the alleged rape event was consensual, because there is a less 
developed rape myth structure about an accuser’s willingness to have sex 
with a stranger. In such cases, many strangers deny the encounter even 
occurred, causing physical evidence to play a greater role. Although real 
rape garners the most media attention, simple rape is far more common.144 
In fact, the myth that real rape is the norm actually increases jury skepticism 
of accusers who allege simple rape.145 For the overwhelming majority of 
cases, especially those that culminate in a trial, consent is the focal point for 
the defense strategy. Proving a reasonable doubt as to the accuser’s non-
consent is a much easier burden to meet than denying that penetration 
actually occurred. The result is that the accuser bears the entire burden of 
performance in a rape trial and must do everything in her power to 
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overcome the idea of simulation, gender stereotypes, roles, and scripts 
being deployed by the defense.  
The burden of performance is made even more difficult by certain 
linguistic defense strategies. There are no neutral language choices that can 
be made by the complainants during a rape trial.146 Even the statement of 
“no” in opposition to a would-be rapist is filtered through cultural and 
linguistic assumptions that render it indeterminate in meaning.147 Not only 
do accusers face the well-known bromide that “no sometimes means yes,” 
they must also confront more subtle dismissals of “no” meaning no.148 
Empirical evidence shows that unless the “no” is repeated and accompanied 
by physical resistance, it is unlikely to be believed.149 Further, depending on 
what non-neutral meaning jurors ascribe to “normal sex,” they will reach 
very different interpretations of what rape is.150 Because a common cultural 
belief holds that “playing hard to get” is “normal sex,” any of the jurors 
may refuse to vote to convict because of a strong belief in forceful 
seduction.151 There are also significant gender gaps in determining what 
constitutes a threat of force.152 Deciding what constitutes force and what 
force is sufficient to make someone fearful enough to acquiesce is a 
problem of language, and how jurors interpret those concepts is important 
to the final verdict. Interpreting communication at the time of rape is even 
more problematic when viewed from a performative perspective. 
Because of the heavy dependence on oral testimony in a rape trial, 
language shapes and determines how jurors visualize and interpret the 
alleged rape event.153 Defendants in rape cases often deploy language to 
create narratives that paint them as victims of sexual aggression. Susan 
Ehrlich calls this rhetorical move the “grammar of non-agency.”154 When 
the accused adopts this linguistic strategy, he engages in passive voice 
retellings in order to attribute greater responsibility to the accuser.155 The 
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accused is portrayed as being attacked by someone with an agenda, be it 
money, sex, or whatever post hoc rationalization fits the facts of the case. 
The accused is often said to just lay prone to the accuser initiating sex. 
Defense lawyers facilitate the process by framing questions to 
allow the defendant to talk about his experience in non-agency terms. The 
goal is to make the accused appear as a passive object rather than a 
“strategic and active” subject.156 This framing process fits neatly with the 
defense attorney’s attempts to revive notions of the utmost resistance 
standard. 157  When a defendant is portrayed as a simple object in the 
recounting of the alleged rape event, the role of the active subject falls to 
the accuser. Thus, the failure of the accuser to actively resist during the rape 
event becomes a serious liability in the eyes of jurors. She is portrayed as 
the agent in control of the alleged rape event. Her failure to fight back with 
utmost resistance becomes a linguistic reality even when it is not a legal 
one. 
The door to further questioning of the accuser also opens once she 
is the linguistic subject in the narrative of the rape event.158 Why didn’t she 
yell out for help? Why didn’t she run away when she had the chance? Why 
did she go up to his apartment? Why did she kiss him if she did not mean it 
as an overture for sex? Why did she wait to report the crime? 159  The 
questions become endless and eventually present an insurmountable burden 
when the agency of the parties is switched by the defense strategy. Any 
potential misstep by the subject/accuser is portrayed as a fault that 
exonerates the object/accused. The passive accused is little more than a 
prop in the story conveyed to the jury. In contrast, the active role assumed 
by the accuser creates an image of a person with a wide array of options 
that she failed to explore. At least one study has shown that retellings of 
sexual violence stories with passive language ascribed to the attacker make 
the audience less likely to ascribe fault to the attacker and more to the 
accuser.160 
The accusers become agents in the defense narrative, but more 
importantly they are portrayed as “ineffective agents” who must be blamed 
for their failings.161 This final move, where the accuser is denied justice and 
is blamed for her own suffering, completes the patriarchal deterrence 
strategy. Rape victims are not only told that they are not due any recourse 
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through the criminal justice system, but also that they are getting their “just 
desserts” for failing to be the ideal active subjects. In such a world, it should 
not be surprising to find that most rapes go unreported.  
Even when defendants are unable to adopt a purely passive role 
because of other evidence, they can use a variation on the theme to 
accomplish the same goal. Defendants can utilize the myth that men are 
controlled by their sexual urges and that the defendant was unable to control 
his biological impulses.162 This type of argument fits very well with the 
assertion that the accuser was a “tease” who should have known not to prey 
on the defendant’s urges. This pattern of shifting responsibility from the 
defendant to the complainant is accomplished even without an explicit 
passive/active role reversal. 
Again, the contrast with the robbery trial is remarkable. An attempt 
to portray the defendant as a passive object is unlikely to accomplish 
anything in front of the jury. The defendant’s performance in a robbery trial 
is unrelated to gender and probably only bears on issues of truthfulness. 
Claims that a bank left itself open to be robbed by maintaining limited 
security will not persuade a jury that the defendant is not culpable. That the 
bank could have taken numerous precautions or stored less money on-site is 
irrelevant as a matter of law. The victims of robbery do not have to show 
that they tried their hardest to resist the efforts to steal money. In fact, a 
bank may well be praised for turning over its assets without resistance in 
order to protect the lives of customers and employees. 
Of course, the purpose of the American system of adversarial 
justice is such that truth is found between competing narratives of the 
alleged rape event described to the jury. This idyllic formulation of the 
means by which criminal trials operate requires a prosecutor to combat the 
narrative constructed by the defense. Under most areas of law, this position 
seems defensible. In the context of rape trials, however, certain linguistic 
and legal obstacles heavily privilege the defense’s narrative strategy and 
ensure that juries overwhelmingly adopt the defendants’ versions of the 
alleged rape event. The utmost resistance standard historically allowed 
judges to admit evidence and arguments that permitted juries to insert their 
own prejudices and conceptions of gender identity. No matter which of the 
current or proposed frameworks our justice system adopts for adjudicating 
rape trials, the result is the same: accusers become social constructions of 
the jury. In such a world, the prosecutors have little room to push juries 
toward more progressive and feminist notions of gender. The defense 
strategy is one that fits neatly with most traditional, patriarchal perspectives 
on rape law that are found within the jury.  
The end product of the burden of performance is not unlike that of 
the “CSI effect” that some have argued has raised juror’s expectations in 
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many cases. 163  Because of television shows like CSI, 164  some scholars 
believe that jurors have come to expect significant forensic evidence that 
most lawyers are unable to deliver.165 Jurors expect definitive answers on 
many basic questions at a trial.166 The fact that CSI and other shows are 
entirely fictional has not discouraged jurors from applying expectations 
based upon their television viewing onto real-life trials.167 In a system of 
justice that uses a standard of guilt of beyond a reasonable doubt, such 
barriers all but assure an incredibly low percentage of rape reports actually 
result in rape convictions or pleas. 
Whatever the source of these myths and narratives, their effect is 
real in creating a heavy burden of performance on the accuser in rape trials. 
To assess the impact of the burden of performance can be a difficult 
endeavor for a jury. Nonetheless, some measure of performance is essential 
for understanding the problems of performance at a rape trial. 
V. MEASURING THE BURDEN OF PERFORMANCE 
Assessing performances in a non-legal environment is inherently 
problematic. Taste and perspective render almost any attempt to objectively 
evaluate the quality of a performance an extremely difficult task. In a 
courtroom environment, however, the value of a performance is assessed by 
one simple factor: the verdict. While the jury’s decision is not an objective 
criterion, it is the only one that matters when evaluating courtroom 
performances.  
The concept of gender in performance creates an array of 
difficulties in the mediation of messages to the jury. The accuser must 
compete with preexisting notions of gender roles and of sexual violence.168 
The accused may sometimes utilize the strategic advantage of rape myths 
found in mainstream society.169 Reality in a rape trial is an event mediated 
through language such that witness testimony, arguments by lawyers, and 
decisions by judges and juries cannot be understood without an appreciation 
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of rhetoric and performance.170 As Brenda Danet has explained, “[w]hen the 
meaning of an act is ambiguous, the words we choose to talk about it 
become critical.”171 
This Article isolates two important areas of measuring 
performance. First, because of the sheer volume of rape narratives, stories, 
and imagery present in American culture, desensitization among the public 
and psychological dissociation between the complainant and jurors are 
legitimate sources of concern. Second, the defendant’s performance is often 
able to access the myth of rape as pornography in order to appeal to the 
jury’s prurient interest. These concepts represent measures of performance 
because of media saturation of rape and pornography stories and images. 
Each of these phenomena is discussed infra. 
A. Desensitization and Dissociation 
When a concept is over-signified in society, its impact on the 
listener continually decreases.172 The problem for rape advocacy groups and 
prosecutors is no longer that rape is invisible to the public at large. Rather, 
rape is visible all too often in the news, in fictional stories, in real crime 
stories, in movies, and on television. Rape trials themselves are important 
media events that disseminate a wide array of fact patterns to the American 
public.173 The problem of underrepresentation in the 1960s and 1970s174 has 
slowly been replaced with overrepresentation. In a world where rape and 
violence are constantly represented and re-represented, there can be no 
blank slate from which to educate a juror about sexual violence.175 While 
there was certainly never a juror who was an empty vessel, the degree to 
which Americans have been constructed concerning rape is astounding.  
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Even when the messages are transmitted as fiction, their effects are 
significant in forming social attitudes about rape.176 In fact, fictionalized 
stories often personalize and dramatize the issues surrounding rape as to 
render them more powerful in shaping societal attitudes.177 The characters 
can be portrayed in paper-thin stereotypical fashion to fit whatever passions 
the story creators wish. The result is a story thoroughly disconnected from 
“real” rape events, but with emotional potency that can engender a strong 
emotional response in the audience. 
The endless saturation of messages and images creates an inherent 
ambiguity and indeterminacy of meaning such that ideology guides the 
audience to choose what it wants to hear.178 Each juror in a rape trial has 
substantial life experience watching fictionalized rape and consensual sex 
through every form of media. However, mainstream media has barely 
noticed alternative perspectives and voices regarding sexual violence.179 
When they do appear, they are constrained by the dominant narratives 
surrounding rape and sexual assault.180 Jurors must mediate performances 
on the witness stand through media depictions regarding rape. If any 
member of the jury has seen the extremely graphic rape of Monica Belluci’s 
character, Alex, in Irreversible,181 that will shape the juror’s assessment of 
what rape looks like. If they watch Law & Order,182 CSI, or any of the 
numerous crime and lawyer programs that pepper the airwaves, a jury’s 
understanding of rape and its treatment in the criminal justice system will 
have been affected. Any juror would surely have read newspaper and 
magazine accounts of any number of actual rape stories. They may well 
know of lurid tales of false allegations of rape. Perhaps they know the story 
of the rape in Big Dan’s Tavern through news accounts or the Jodie Foster 
movie, The Accused, 183  that was inspired by the story. 184  Moreover, 
television movies-of-the-week have dramatized rapes and rape trials in a 
way that has further blurred the distinction between fact and fiction.185  
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There are also significant historical tales of rape that shape public 
attitudes. The biblical tale of Potiphar’s wife, who falsely claimed Joseph 
raped her as revenge for his rejecting her, demonstrates that rape myth 
stories have a long history in Western culture.186As Taslitz has observed, 
the negative portrayals of women that give rise to rape myths can even be 
found in children’s stories such as Peter Pan.187 In the well-known story, 
Tinkerbell’s (sexual) jealously drives the fairy to lie in an attempt to kill 
Peter’s girlfriend Wendy.188 This sexual jealousy myth appears in many 
defense strategies that portray an accuser as manufacturing a false 
complaint.  
Unfortunately, mainstream media has not balanced rape myth 
stories with feminist arguments. There has been very little effort to integrate 
rape reform arguments into the dominant discourse.189 The focus on stories 
about individuals, as opposed to complex systems and institutions, all but 
assures that feminist notions of rape are not broadcast to the public.190 
Reformer narratives cannot be easily distilled into forms ready made for 
television, movies, and other mainstream media. As a result, the emphasis 
in media has been on real rape and the subtleties of feminist ideas have not 
been disseminated sufficiently to the mass audience. 
The net effect of this saturation of rape imagery is not positive for 
victims. The results of the over-signification of rape images and stories are 
similar to the effects that have been observed in media portrayals of disaster 
and relief aid, as the next section will discuss. Rape reformers can gain 
important insights by examining the communication dynamics at play in 
these areas.  
1. Disaster Pornography 
Disaster pornography is the manner in which media portrays 
famine, disease, war, and other natural disasters. The primary critique of 
disaster images is that they sensationalize victims of disaster in ways that 
are similar to pornography’s exaggeration of sex.191 When a child suffering 
from starvation in Africa is photographed crouched on the ground, covered 
in flies, and with a large swollen belly, a particular series of messages is 
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conveyed to the audience.192 When images of the starving child are played 
and replayed, a construction of famine is transmitted to the West. This 
conception has certain hyperreal elements that make the suffering of the 
children “more real than the real.”193 The media’s use of the iconic starving 
child lacks nuance and understanding of famine, but it creates a conception 
of “famine” that has all the trappings of the real event.  
Although there are no images of local warlords blocking food 
distribution, explanations of how broken economies undermine crop 
development efforts, videos of localized efforts to restore agricultural 
production to the area, or an understanding of any of the factors that created 
the famine, there is a clear and powerful image of what famine means. The 
lack of detail, meaning, or any “real” understanding is unimportant because 
the images often accomplish exactly what they are intended to do: they sell 
newspapers, they result in increased donations, and they shock the 
audience. Two human rights workers offered this account of the media’s 
creation of disaster pornography: 
Somali doctors and nurses have expressed shock at the conduct of 
film crews in hospitals. They rush through crowded corridors, 
leaping over stretchers, dashing to film the agony before it passes. 
They hold bedside vigils to record the moment of death. When 
the Italian actress Sophia Loren visited Somalia, the paparazzi 
trampled on children as they scrambled to film her feeding a little 
girl—three times. This is disaster pornography. 
 
Reduced to nameless extras in the shadows behind Western aid 
workers or disaster tourists, the grieving, hurting and humiliated 
human beings are not asked if they want to be portrayed in this 
degrading way.194  
While disaster pornography has been identified in the context of starvation 
and famine, any disaster may suffice for media manipulation. The 2004 
tsunami affecting Asia revived the notion of disaster pornography as the 
West was constantly barraged with images depicting the destruction and 
suffering caused by tidal waves.195 Similarly, Hurricane Katrina created an 
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onslaught of media coverage that sensationalized the horror and resulted in 
more disaster porn for America to view. 196  In the end, the signs that 
compose disaster pornography are simulations of Baudrillard’s third 
order—they are copies with no originals. While they are “real” disasters, 
the images and ideas propagated by the media are something else. Snippets 
are carefully connected, orchestrated into a larger package, and played and 
replayed in order to construct a social understanding of disasters. 
The effects of disaster pornography are twofold. First, compassion 
fatigue becomes prominent in the audience because of repeated viewings of 
disaster pornography. 197  A more common term for this phenomenon is 
“overexposure.” When the public becomes tired of seeing the most graphic 
and horrifying images, it often exhibits desensitization whereby future 
images of suffering do not hold the same resonance as the first, carefully 
selected, shocking images. In international fundraising efforts, this means 
support for various crises eventually dwindles. 198  When the next great 
disaster comes, it has to surpass the previous disaster or hold some other 
unique property to avoid being just another disaster. An average hurricane 
or tornado hardly registers in the American public’s consciousness because 
it has been overdone. After Katrina, hurricane Rita was an unimpressive 
sequel.199 Unless there are record winds, unusual threats to celebrities, or 
especially unique images, the story will not be widely distributed because it 
lacks the same effect as the last time it was reported.200  
It is important to distinguish this theory from the commonly 
debated notions of desensitization in areas like television violence. Unlike 
arguments that television violence desensitizes children so they are more 
apt to engage in acts like those depicted on the screen,201 the theory of 
disaster pornography is subtler. Rather than trying to replicate the acts on 
the screen, the viewer of disaster pornography becomes numb to 
suffering.202  This theory of numbing as a result of exposure to horrific 
imagery examines a weaker effect than that proposed by television studies, 
which aims to show total desensitization. As will be discussed below, there 
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is substantial psychological evidence to show this that the numbing theory 
is typified in disaster pornography. 
A second related concern with disaster pornography is that the 
shocking images create a dissociative effect between the audience and those 
suffering.203 This disconnect occurs in part because of mass media’s one-
way style of communication. Viewing a television or reading a magazine 
does not afford a viewer or reader the chance to interact with those 
suffering, or even those who have reported the disaster. This media 
distancing is not unlike that experienced by an audience watching a movie 
or a play.204 The viewer may yell at the actress to turn around before the 
monster attacks her, but no one is listening to the plea from the audience. In 
disaster pornography the media selects images that create a complex 
relationship between the victim and the viewer. The starving child is often 
picked to look with sad eyes directly into the camera, and as a result, at the 
viewer. Whereas watching a murder on television removes our subjectivity 
by rendering us passive in changing the outcome, disaster pornography 
simultaneously places the audience as an object viewing the horror and a 
subject capable of changing the outcome. This complex relationship, 
according to Slavoj Zizek, causes the audience to distance itself from the 
disaster pornography in the same way that it removes itself from the events 
in a fictional story.205 Seeing the suffering child in Africa staring through 
the television creates a psychological need in the audience to pretend that 
the event is not really happening as a means to cure the guilt and confusion 
from the symbolic relationship with the disaster victim.206 
2. Rape as Disaster Pornography 
While it may not be wholly apparent, there are several important 
similarities between the constructions of disasters and rape. Rape trials are 
an important communication event where rape stories are shaped by the 
media’s construction of the concepts of gender and sexual violence. Like a 
disaster, rape is an event that jurors often have learned about through one-
way media, fictional stories, and images created for dramatic effect. 
Because of such similarities, it is not hard to see how compassion fatigue or 
dissociation can occur and increase the burden of performance on the 
accuser. 
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A person who is on the witness stand telling her story of rape does 
not just have to convince the jury that she is telling the truth. Instead, 
because of the desensitization effect, she has to compete with every movie, 
television program, book, magazine, newspaper, and website depicting rape 
or consensual sex that any of the twelve jurors has ever seen. If her story 
does not measure up to the jury’s high standards as constructed by years of 
mass media inculcation of rape imagery, then the defendant will walk free. 
Each fictionalized account of rape normalizes and naturalizes rape in a way 
that makes potential jurors numb from the repetitive experiences.207 
Traditional feminist critiques of media depictions of rape have 
focused on cases where the media message is patriarchal.208 Usually this 
occurs where the person raped is portrayed as being a guilty party or when 
rape is romanticized as what a “woman wants.”209 The disaster pornography 
and desensitization argument is concerned with the flipside of the existing 
critique—repeated viewing of graphic rape images, even those with limited 
patriarchal connotations, can create the same pernicious effects as disaster 
pornography. 
The images of the especially graphic and shocking rapes in mass 
media create a standard that is too high for most accusers to meet in front of 
a jury already confronted with conflicting accounts of an alleged rape event. 
A jury who hears about a run-of-the-mill simple rape where the accuser was 
intoxicated is likely to shrug at the details of the complainant’s story. The 
jurors have heard it all before, but with more shocking details, more 
horrifying tidbits, and, if through movie or television, with an 
accompanying audio/video record. The accuser cannot inject extra details 
like the movie-of-the-week screenwriter. She cannot ask the makeup artist 
to paint on extra bruises before her big entrance. And she certainly cannot 
ask the director to have the defendant portrayed in an uglier light to 
highlight his evil nature. Rather, the accuser’s story is limited by what she 
remembers and what she told the police when she first reported her rape. 
Any variation from that story will hurt her credibility and will likely ruin a 
chance for conviction.210 And yet, with her heavy burden of performance, if 
she does not improve her story, a conviction is unlikely because of the 
jury’s desensitization to her rather mundane rape narrative. 
Just as the call of the starving African child eventually goes 
unanswered, the accuser’s statements on the stand can fail to impress a 
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jaded jury. When a rape is recounted through oral testimony, with limited 
physical evidence, it is likely to underwhelm a jury that has heard much 
better stories and seen more convincing accounts of rape. The fact that 
television or movie rapes may have been fictional does not mean a jury’s 
conception of rape is not actively shaped by them. As discussed earlier, 
fictional accounts can be more powerful because they are dramatized and 
sensationalized. Furthermore, the fictional accounts often lack the 
uncertainty and nuance that jurors often confront in rape trials. 
The defense can also take advantage of the intersection of the 
desensitization of rape and the roles ascribed to the accuser. A story that 
portrays the accuser as a money-grubber becomes more potent if the 
victim’s injuries are minor and her tale not particularly lurid. The jury can 
be convinced that the accuser has simply decided to take financial 
advantage of unpleasant sex or that she is using the rape complaint out of 
regret for having sex with the defendant. If the details of the alleged rape 
are not shocking, the defense can easily dovetail the regret story with the 
facts of the case. As the defense capitalizes on the intersections of these 
narratives, the accuser’s burden of performance becomes heavier. 
The dissociation effect is also readily transferable to the rape trial 
context. An accuser on the witness stand is not unlike the starving child or 
numerous other repeated images found in disaster pornography. When 
jurors hear an account of the alleged rape event, they are placed in the same 
unusual position of the disaster porn viewer. Jurors play the role of the 
object by passively hearing the story of rape. They are unable to change 
what transpired or even inquire further about the story being told. If they are 
confused by details, they are restrained by legal procedure from asking the 
witness to clarify. However, the jury also plays the role of the subject 
during the trial. As fact-finders, jurors ultimately determine the outcome of 
the trial. They interact with and attempt to persuade each other of their 
beliefs concerning a defendant’s guilt or innocence. These facts, however, 
are not unique to rape trials—jurors play this role in every criminal case. 
What distinguishes the rape juror from other criminal case jurors, or 
specifically those in the bank robbery example, are numerous factors 
relating to gender and the inability to comprehend the concept of rape 
independent of mass media constructions. Gender is a performative 
concept, and in a rape trial, a jury is constantly judging an accuser’s gender. 
In a non-rape criminal trial, the concept of gender is rarely introduced. As a 
result, the constant judging of past and present performances is not 
something for the jury to consider. This is illustrated in the two thought 
experiments that began this discussion. A jury hearing a robbery case is 
unlikely to consider whether the accuser was a charitable person prone to 
giving money away. They are not going to question whether the accuser 
looks like the type to give money to someone and then lie to the police 
about it. While the jurors do make the normal credibility assessments based 
on the witness’ performance in the courtroom, that is a relatively small-
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scale analysis compared to injecting numerous loaded assessments of 
gender performativity. Jurors may find a complainant not credible on issues 
of performance, such as being a drug addict or habitual liar, but those 
evaluations do not compare well to those made about gender. When jurors 
attempt to assess a gender performance, they must not only draw from their 
own gender identity, but also the incredible array of materials about gender 
in the mass media. Trying to pigeonhole an accuser into one of the 
categories described by Crenshaw is only part of their mission. Because of 
social constructions of what can constitute rape, a juror is often faced with 
determining whether one of Crenshaw’s types can even be raped. In this 
way, jurors in rape trials become subjects of a higher order than those 
commonly found in most criminal cases. 
Unlike robbery or simple assault trials, the gulf of 
misunderstanding between a juror who has not been raped and the accuser 
can be enormous. A study of jury reform in Tennessee showed that a juror 
who has been raped is very unlikely to survive the voir dire process.211 
While most jurors can comprehend various crimes that go to physical injury 
or monetary loss, a rape case has unique gender and power issues. Even in a 
murder trial, where jurors are unlikely to have had a personal frame of 
reference, jurors have a greater ability to comprehend the crime. With 
murder, the jury can more easily determine whether the event was murder 
or suicide (the simulation of murder) because the physical evidence is 
different in these two circumstances. In a rape trial, however, jurors are 
usually left to analyze the difference between consensual sex, something 
they probably have substantial knowledge about, and rape, something they 
have to rely on mass media to understand, using physical evidence that 
supports both claims. 
This inability to understand rape creates the same confusion in a 
juror as it does in the disaster porn viewer—the juror cannot look away, yet 
has little to gain by looking deeper at the situation. Jurors can make the 
same dissociative move as the person viewing disaster pornography. 
Ultimately, this disconnect cannot help the accuser gain credibility in front 
of a jury. Instead, the jurors want to look away and pretend the events are 
just unfolding on the stage before them. 
Victoria Grace offers an example of a documentary in New Zealand 
that is helpful for understanding the difficulties in one-way communication 
about sexual assault.212 In the documentary, Girl Talk, the camera crew was 
charged with being the “fly-on-the-wall” to observe personal conversations. 
The conversations were not scripted and wide ranges of people were filmed. 
In one particular segment, a middle-aged woman offered her feelings about 
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sex.213 She explained that she did not enjoy sex very much because she 
found it painful. Her first experience with penetration had been when she 
was raped at a young age. For Grace, the broadcast was significant because 
there was no opportunity for “reciprocal exchange for that woman.” 214 
When the mass media sent the video to households around New Zealand, 
something very personal and intimate was made very public. The person in 
the segment had no opportunity for mutual exchange; she was only a sender 
in the situation and had no means to engage her audience. 
While a rape trial is not broadcast by technology to the jury, the 
same model of one-way communication is at play. The accuser on the 
witness stand can only tell her story. She has no ability to interact 
meaningfully with the jury. The jury cannot question the complainant, the 
victim cannot question the jury, and the trial setting offers no other 
possibility of dialogue. The dissociative effect is caused not by 
technological replication, but by the rules and procedures of the American 
criminal courtroom. The ability to empathize with or otherwise engage a 
person recounting her rape is totally eviscerated by the distance between the 
jurors and the witness stand. When twelve jurors hear the intimate story of 
rape, it is almost indistinguishable from hearing it through television or in a 
movie.  
This dissociation effect magnifies the burden of performance 
because it increases the gulf between the accuser/sender and jury/receiver. 
A jury that has become dissociated from the particular story of the victim 
will be a tough crowd and not amenable to logical persuasion. When there 
is no intimacy in the victim’s story of rape, the jury’s detachment makes it 
hard to develop a rapport with the accuser. Just as the person filmed in Girl 
Talk did not achieve a meaningful connection to the mass audience, a rape 
victim on the stand will struggle to gain empathy from a jury. Without that 
connection, it becomes easier for a jury to apply negative labels like 
“unstable” to a person for whom they have little or no feeling. The burden 
of performance, through dissociation, eventually becomes a wall between 
victim and jury that further diminishes hope for conviction. 
It may be argued that my account of rape trial jurors is too 
simplistic and underestimates a juror’s capacity to understand the gravity of 
a rape trial. However, the story that this Article tells is only possible in a 
world where images and stories of rape are ubiquitous. The jurors do not 
become dissociated from the accuser in the rape trial because they do not 
care. Rather, they become dissociated because that is what they have 
learned to do every time they have watched a rape on television, read about 
it in the newspaper, or gasped in horror as they viewed the R-rated scenes 
of rape on the big screen. To pretend that jurors can simply turn off such a 
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systemic learned response when the time comes for the real trial is to 
presume a concept of human nature without evidentiary support. Just as 
disaster relief agencies can point to the bottom line to show the diminishing 
returns from the use of disaster pornography, sex crime prosecutors can 
highlight the incredibly low number of reports that actually turn into 
convictions.215 The jury in a rape trial has too many opportunities to buy 
into the defense story and avoid the thorny, disturbing questions 
surrounding issues of rape. A juror with a learned psychological response, 
loaded with a variety of explanations and justifications from a well-trained 
defense attorney, will not vote to convict except in the most unusual cases. 
The perceived importance and objectivity of a courtroom can also 
fuel the biases of the jury. Susan Sontag observed that photography, by 
appearing to be an objective source of reality, creates an illusion of truth.216 
Photography, by being invasive and capturing moments of personal life, 
seemingly gives a true account of reality. 217  However, Sontag argues, 
photography is actually an incredible seducer that makes the viewer believe 
in a version of reality that has been reduced to singular images. 218 
Photographs thus form an alternate reality or fantasy whereby viewers are 
fooled into believing they have a real understanding of what has been 
photographed.219 In many ways, a rape trial operates in the same manner. 
The testimony is an invasive attempt to access the real events of the 
accuser’s personal life. Because of the courtroom setting, the trial maintains 
the trappings of reality and truth. However, in reconstructing the 
happenings of the alleged rape event, the jurors can be seduced into 
believing they understand what really occurred. This attempt to be objective 
means that the juror is not on guard against his or her biases, and the 
seriousness of the situation actually lends itself to the injection of the juror’s 
cultural belief. The juror can be seduced by the gravity of the situation to 
believe he or she is actually finding truth rather than interpreting various 
accounts of the same events. 
There are certainly jurors who do not make the mistakes described 
above. There will be those who have not encountered many depictions of 
rape. Others may be well informed about the concept of rape and aware of 
the dangers of media depictions of rape. It is an open question whether 
members of this last group are likely to appear in the final jury pool. 
Nonetheless, there are people who would not exhibit the disaster 
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pornography reactions. What is a fact, however, is that every potential juror 
could fall into the pattern described above, and in most cases, a single juror 
can prevent a conviction for rape. To assume that there are only perfect or 
exceptional jurors is to ignore the sad realities of most rape trials. A 
prosecution for rape is an appeal not to the perfect juror, but to every juror, 
including those jaded by stories of rape and those who dissociate rather than 
adjudicate.  
B. The “Pornographic Vignette” 
Catharine MacKinnon once observed that rape trials are 
pornographic 220  in nature. 221  Nowhere else are such lurid details of an 
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quadraphonic sex; there is a representation of sex, but one with no original. Instead, the 
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individual’s sexual life put so prominently before the public.222 Carol Smart 
has even referred to an accuser’s experience as reciting a “pornographic 
vignette” for the jury and audience.223 The emphasis of these arguments by 
Smart and MacKinnon has been to demonstrate the revictimization and 
deterrence effects of legal rules. The requirement that an accuser reveal so 
many personal details is often a painful process and deters would-be 
complainants from reporting the rape or testifying.224 However, this is only 
part of the picture concerning the pornographic nature of a rape trial. Also 
of importance is the pornographic effect of the testimony on the audience. 
When examining the issues of rape and pornography, many 
scholars have attempted to find a causal connection showing that 
pornography leads to rape and sexual violence.225 Some research has tried to 
focus on especially violent pornography whereas other investigations have 
tried to connect non-pornographic, but still misogynistic, images with 
rape.226 While such lines of inquiry are partially relevant to this Article, this 
section is limited to focusing on very different connections between 
pornography and rape.  
Some commentators argue that the portrayal of rape fantasy 
scenarios make men 227  more accepting of such possibilities in the real 
world.228 While the various studies often suffer from control problems and 
generally have not been able to show that the observed correlations actually 
entail causation,229  they are significant for some of their lesser-debated 
findings. What requires more attention is that several of these studies do 
show that rape imagery changes attitudes and that those attitudes change 
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behavior in a limited fashion. While no one has performed a study about the 
way jurors make decisions based upon prior viewing of rape imagery, the 
various lab setting studies that do exist suggest that rape media would have 
a significant effect on the attitudes of jurors. 
An oft-cited study by Edward Donnerstein and Leonard Berkowitz 
demonstrated that in laboratory settings, males who were exposed to violent 
pornography were more likely to engage in hostile reactions to females.230 
In the study, men were either angered or treated fairly by fellow study 
participants prior to what they believed was the experiment. Both groups of 
men were then shown films that depicted consensual sexual activity or rape 
scenes. The control group viewed a nonsexual, neutral film. The angered 
male subjects were then instructed to apply an electric shock to the fellow 
experiment participant that had angered them. The male subjects were to 
shock participant when they failed to perform certain tasks. None of the 
films increased shocks against males in the study. However, angered males 
who viewed rape scenes did increase shock intensity against females.231 
Men who were not previously angered also demonstrated increased 
aggression, but only when they viewed rape scenes where the person raped 
enjoyed being victimized.232 
Another study by Dolf Zillman and Jennings Bryant showed that, 
when men viewed pornography depicting degradation of females who were 
nonetheless “eager to accommodate any and every imaginable sexual urge 
of every man in the vicinity,”233 they favored shorter prison sentences for 
rapists.234 A study by Neil M. Malamuth showed that men who viewed 
pornography that seemingly endorsed sexual violence were more likely to 
fantasize about rape.235 
While these studies fall short of showing any definitive connection 
between viewing pornography and committing rape,236 they do demonstrate 
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a strong connection between viewing pornography and the formation of 
certain attitudes about sex and rape. That these attitudes may cause a 
resultant behavior is beyond the scope of any of these experiments. 
However, one can conclude that men who view violent or even nonviolent 
pornography become more accepting of rape in some sense and may even 
fantasize about it. That they may actually prefer lower sentences for rapists 
has a direct bearing in the criminal justice context. 
While it is dangerous to over-generalize from the studies above, it 
is still disconcerting to imagine the cumulative effect of regular viewing of 
pornography on prospective male jurors. When men internalize the 
depictions commonly found in pornographic materials, they become 
dangerous jurors for the prosecution of a rape trial. While there have been 
no direct studies in the jury setting, it is hard to imagine the results would 
be different from the controlled environment experiments. At a minimum, 
the existing social science research shows that men on rape trial juries are 
ideal candidates to believe defense narratives about how an alleged rape 
event occurred. There can be no doubt that defense lawyers, even when they 
do not understand these particular biases, will create stories and arguments 
to take advantage of them. 
Substantial evidence also shows the prevalence of rape fantasies 
among men.237 These stories are often depicted in pornography and shown 
as positive, harmless events.238 When the same purveyor of pornography 
appears in a jury pool, the results can be significant. One major defense 
strategy in simple rape cases is to argue the harmless version of the rape 
fantasy—the reluctant female eventually gives in to male power and 
submits to his desire. The accuser’s testimony about her fear and pain 
mirrors the acting of porn stars. The ability to differentiate the real crime of 
rape from the fictional rape stories is a difficult endeavor when the defense 
is actually acting to intrigue the juror. This is not simply a case of rape 
pornography making rape more acceptable. Rather, the trial itself is the 
pornography that reinforces the learned response from viewing other 
pornographic images. The defense’s story creates reasonable doubt. 
However, unlike most criminal cases, this doubt is due to the juror’s 
enjoyment of seeing his constructed fantasy acted out and described in a 
courtroom setting. 
At first blush, the comparison between a rape trial and hard core 
pornography may seem extreme or even distasteful. After all, arguing that a 
proper legal proceeding with a strong air of authority is like a free-for-all 
orgy on television can seem to be a stretch. However, to underestimate the 
sexual nature of the proceeding for some jurors would be a serious mistake. 
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Just as men in controlled experimental settings, not unlike the sterile 
environment of a courtroom, begin to fantasize about rape after viewing 
rape pornography, it is not unreasonable to assume some jurors do the same. 
The pornographic vignettes of the accuser are morphed by the defense to 
appeal to male juror fantasies. Jurors can play out fantasies of seduction in 
their mind in response to defense arguments. 
One may argue that a trial setting has such gravity that no juror 
could seriously be excited by such an environment. However, rather than 
creating a greater sense of objectivity, a rape trial removes the cognitive 
distance between the juror and a rape. Normally, the male juror is confined 
to viewing a rape through pornography. Such a perspective is usually two-
dimensional and the viewer has no role in the eventual outcome. During a 
trial, however, he actually gets to hear from a real live rape victim and 
decide whether the event was rape or sex. When the accuser is on the stand, 
the reality of the situation gives the male juror a connection to an event that 
can titillate and stimulate him. This can even be the case where the juror is 
consciously horrified by what he is hearing. The subtext of hearing the rape 
fantasy fulfilled is still omnipresent. 
When the defense offers its theory of the crime, the juror is able to 
cleanse the negative aspects of the alleged rape event away so that he can 
enjoy the pure rough sex fantasy he has always wanted. This does not have 
to be the case with any more than one of twelve jurors for the defense to 
gain a meaningful advantage. The prurient interest and effects of the 
pornographic narrative can be used by defense counsel to create reasonable 
doubt. While the reasons for that doubt may be distasteful and ugly to 
consider, social science is suggestive enough to make us evaluate the exact 
role of defense narratives in achieving acquittals. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The exclusive focus on statutory tinkering of rape law is doomed to 
fail. As requirements such as the utmost resistance standard have receded, 
they have been replaced with cultural norms that have the same effect.239 As 
long as jurors are free to inject their prejudices into rape trials, their 
attitudes will trump rulemaking. The jurors of today’s rape trials have been 
molded and constructed by an array of rape stories and imagery in 
mainstream and pornographic media. These formative factors mean that 
there has been a shift from a problem of rape unawareness to rape over-
awareness. Society has become saturated with rape narratives in all media 
forms, creating a substantial presumption against the stories of 
complainants. The over-signification of rape means rape myths have taken 
hold in virtually every prospective juror and any decent defense attorney 
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can take advantage of those hidden attitudes. As Susan Ehrlich noted, 
“interpretation of progressive statutory laws is impossible to separate from 
the cultural backdrop against which it is interpreted.”240 
This inculcation of jurors places a burden of performance on the 
accuser. While the prosecution should certainly bear the burden of proof, a 
separate burden should not fall on those with the least advantage in a 
criminal trial, the complainants. Without legal representation, unless they 
pursue a separate civil suit, and without belief by society, accusers must put 
their very gender identity on trial. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the 
jury will not only render a verdict, they will decide if the accuser is a 
whore, a tease, mentally unstable, or one of the other socially-defined 
characters. 
In a given trial, dissociation and desensitization will determine the 
extent to which the jury believes the complainant. Because the jury is 
composed of members who likely have been inundated with rape stories 
and imagery, there are substantial reasons to believe that jurors have 
become desensitized and dissociated from simple rape stories articulated 
during a trial. If any of the jurors is allured by the pornographic details of 
the alleged rape, the burden will almost certainly be insurmountable. An 
inculcated jury will pass judgment on the accuser while freeing the accused.  
How then is it possible to inoculate a jury against the inculcation of 
rape media? The heart of the battle will surely be cultural.241 As long as 
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rape myths form the dominant meta-narrative, those attitudes will seep into 
the jury box. Swaying the minds and hearts of future rape trial jurors is not 
something that can reasonably be expected in the near term, but it is 
something that must occur over the long run for rape prosecutions to have 
real success. 
Still, there are important practical lessons that should be derived 
from this Article. While the focus here is scholarly in nature, the emphasis 
on language and performance in understanding rape trials can also bridge 
the gap between the ivory tower of academia and the day-to-day realities of 
prosecuting sexual violence.242 Rhetoric and performance are factors that 
should be important to both the practitioners who must make the linguistic 
choices and the academics who study rape law. Ignoring juror 
desensitization and dissociation, as well as the performative concerns of the 
pornographic vignette ensures the process of statutory change will continue 
to yield only modest gains.  
Exploring the intersection of language, performance, and 
substantive rape law demonstrates that statutes and legal decision-making 
are still secondary means to effect change in the area of sexual violence.243 
Recognizing the role of rhetoric and performance helps reorient the 
discussion of policy change to new alternatives while actually showing the 
potential for such reforms. 244  Future reforms need to ensure limited 
flexibility in allowing language and culture to undermine enforcement.245 
Efforts to change intent standards and definitions of consent are especially 
problematic because they fail to account for the slipperiness of language 
and the media conceptions of rape that have heavily constructed jurors. 
What is “consent” to a juror in modern America? The question can only be 
answered by examining how media has constructed consent in fictional rape 
stories and other media. Defining rape in an academic bubble will not affect 
a jury that already “knows” what consent means. 
There are already some proposals that show the possibility of 
radical reform which take into account the performative problems of rape 
trials. The conclusion of Taslitz’s work described in this Article is that rules 
of evidence that are feminist in nature should be adopted.246 These new 
rules would include allowing uninterrupted narrative testimony by 
complainants on direct examination, using empathetic experts, and 
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intermediaries to “translate” defense counsel questions. 247  Other radical 
alternatives could include allowing interaction between the jury and accuser 
through written questioning, limiting the use of certain defense strategies 
based upon rape myths, and requiring a “rape-qualified” jury that would not 
be as susceptible to rape myth strategies. Each of these proposals raises 
constitutional questions in the area of due process and the right to 
confrontation that are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nonetheless, conventional structural reform must be replaced with 
policies, like those above, that incorporate new modes of communication 
and procedural rules that seek to bridge the gap between accuser and jury. 
In the meantime, what is needed is a fuller accounting of the rhetorical and 
performative issues at play in rape trials so that policies can be designed to 
address those concerns.  
The past efforts at rape law reform have had very modest effects on 
reducing sexual violence. With an understanding of those partial successes 
and the shortcomings of the critiques, new policy alternatives can aid in 
efforts to prevent rapes and sexual assaults. By recognizing the insidious 
myths and messages that determine the outcomes of rape trials, we can 
begin to imagine a world where rape is the exception rather than the rule. 
To continue to view rape through the lens of rule-making is to pretend the 
jury is insulated from an American culture saturated with rape imagery and 
pornography. To make a meaningful reduction in sexual violence, 
academics, practitioners, judges, and activists must begin to recognize that 
the burden of performance is devastating to an accuser. Hopefully, with a 
fuller understanding of performance and representation during rape trials, 
complainants may actually receive justice in the American criminal justice 
system. 
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